Comments on: Why even Bert Brown’s new “Triple E” Senate reform plan for Canada still won’t work .. http://www.counterweights.ca/2011/11/why-even-bert-brown%e2%80%99s-new-%e2%80%9ctriple-e%e2%80%9d-senate-reform-plan-for-canada-still-won%e2%80%99t-work/ Canadian politics Mon, 10 Jun 2013 11:54:19 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0.1 By: Randall White http://www.counterweights.ca/2011/11/why-even-bert-brown%e2%80%99s-new-%e2%80%9ctriple-e%e2%80%9d-senate-reform-plan-for-canada-still-won%e2%80%99t-work/comment-page-1/#comment-4957 Randall White Sun, 06 Nov 2011 06:07:08 +0000 http://www.counterweights.ca/?p=8887#comment-4957 I originally found the points Mr. Dipper is making here a little hard to grasp — perhaps as a result of my advancing age, or drinking too much hard water the night before. A post by Peter Wrightwater on his Paper Dynamite Online site has made the argument clearer to me. As Mr. Wrightwater explains, Bert Brown's new 7-50 proposal "would make the Senate less EQUAL only insofar as Ontario and Quebec senators acting together (NOT SEPARATELY) could prevent the senators from the remaining eight provinces from STOPPING legislation ... Similarly, the senators from any four provinces acting together could prevent the senators from the remaining six provinces from STOPPING legislation." Mr. Dipper, I think I now see, is making essentially the same argument. And it's no doubt well taken. (Although for still somewhat more clarity "from STOPPING legislation originating in the House of Commons" should probably be specified. The argument does not apply to legislation originating in the Senate itself — to which Mr. Brown's 7-50 formula would not apply either. The extent to which these abstract possibilities regarding the combination of majorities of Senators from various provinces would be likely to happen in practice, in the real world of politics, is also something to wonder about, I think.) Mr. Wrightwater urges as well (aptly enough, it seems to me) that "there is no Central Canada favouritism story here. The 7-50 rule was originally called the Alberta-Vancouver formula, after all." See his piece "New Senate Reform Proposal Does NOT Give Ontario And Quebec An Effective Veto" at http://pdo2.blogspot.com/2011/11/new-senate-reform-proposal-does-not.html . It still similarly seems to me that the crucial defect of Mr. Brown's new plan is its failure to deal with, or even recognize, what Ms. Hébert calls the "federalist version of the sovereignty-association concept Trudeau had fought against on behalf of Canada in the 1980 Quebec referendum" — which is now the essential glue that continues to keep Quebec in Canada. (And this could be dealt with through a kind of Senate reform that reassessed the late 20th absolutist ideology of century provincial equality, while still treating the Senate as an agency of enhanced regional representation for less populous provinces.) I originally found the points Mr. Dipper is making here a little hard to grasp — perhaps as a result of my advancing age, or drinking too much hard water the night before. A post by Peter Wrightwater on his Paper Dynamite Online site has made the argument clearer to me.

As Mr. Wrightwater explains, Bert Brown’s new 7-50 proposal “would make the Senate less EQUAL only insofar as Ontario and Quebec senators acting together (NOT SEPARATELY) could prevent the senators from the remaining eight provinces from STOPPING legislation … Similarly, the senators from any four provinces acting together could prevent the senators from the remaining six provinces from STOPPING legislation.”

Mr. Dipper, I think I now see, is making essentially the same argument. And it’s no doubt well taken. (Although for still somewhat more clarity “from STOPPING legislation originating in the House of Commons” should probably be specified. The argument does not apply to legislation originating in the Senate itself — to which Mr. Brown’s 7-50 formula would not apply either. The extent to which these abstract possibilities regarding the combination of majorities of Senators from various provinces would be likely to happen in practice, in the real world of politics, is also something to wonder about, I think.)

Mr. Wrightwater urges as well (aptly enough, it seems to me) that “there is no Central Canada favouritism story here. The 7-50 rule was originally called the Alberta-Vancouver formula, after all.” See his piece “New Senate Reform Proposal Does NOT Give Ontario And Quebec An Effective Veto” at http://pdo2.blogspot.com/2011/11/new-senate-reform-proposal-does-not.html . It still similarly seems to me that the crucial defect of Mr. Brown’s new plan is its failure to deal with, or even recognize, what Ms. Hébert calls the “federalist version of the sovereignty-association concept Trudeau had fought against on behalf of Canada in the 1980 Quebec referendum” — which is now the essential glue that continues to keep Quebec in Canada. (And this could be dealt with through a kind of Senate reform that reassessed the late 20th absolutist ideology of century provincial equality, while still treating the Senate as an agency of enhanced regional representation for less populous provinces.)

]]> By: Skinny Dipper http://www.counterweights.ca/2011/11/why-even-bert-brown%e2%80%99s-new-%e2%80%9ctriple-e%e2%80%9d-senate-reform-plan-for-canada-still-won%e2%80%99t-work/comment-page-1/#comment-4953 Skinny Dipper Fri, 04 Nov 2011 22:07:40 +0000 http://www.counterweights.ca/?p=8887#comment-4953 My problem with Bert Brown's 7-50 override Senate proposal is that one could translate that as a 4 provinces or representing 50 percent of the population. Imagine nine seats for each province with senators being elected by the First Past the Post system. If one party could win 5 seats in the four smalles provinces with 40 percent of the vote in the winning ridings, that means that means that 20/90 Senators who represent 1.53 percent of Canadian voters who come from the Atlantic provinces could approve a bill passed by the House of Commons. It also means that 10/90 Senators representing Ontario (5/9) and Quebec (5/9) could also effectively pass a bill that has be approved by the House of Commons. The territorial Senators will be meaningless. What does the high override threshold mean to Senate elections. Voters will know that Senate elections will have no effect on an ineffective Senate. A governing party in the House of Commons will only need to campaign to get a majority of the seats within Ontario and Quebec, or get a majority of the seats in any four provinces. Voters will realize that the Senate will become ineffective; citizens will end up not voting. My problem with Bert Brown’s 7-50 override Senate proposal is that one could translate that as a 4 provinces or representing 50 percent of the population. Imagine nine seats for each province with senators being elected by the First Past the Post system. If one party could win 5 seats in the four smalles provinces with 40 percent of the vote in the winning ridings, that means that means that 20/90 Senators who represent 1.53 percent of Canadian voters who come from the Atlantic provinces could approve a bill passed by the House of Commons. It also means that 10/90 Senators representing Ontario (5/9) and Quebec (5/9) could also effectively pass a bill that has be approved by the House of Commons. The territorial Senators will be meaningless.

What does the high override threshold mean to Senate elections. Voters will know that Senate elections will have no effect on an ineffective Senate. A governing party in the House of Commons will only need to campaign to get a majority of the seats within Ontario and Quebec, or get a majority of the seats in any four provinces. Voters will realize that the Senate will become ineffective; citizens will end up not voting.

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